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Abstract: Using a basic monetary model, we assess the effectiveness of stock prices as 
a leading indicator of the East Asian currency crisis in 1997 and 1998. Stock prices are 
incorporated into a monetary model, through the wealth effect postulated by Friedman 
(1988). In addition to the domestic stock price, we also incorporate the stock prices of 
Hong Kong, China and Japan. Using monthly data, the results indicate that the 
domestic stock price, the Hong Kong stock price and particularly US prices are 
significant leading indicators of the crisis. Causality tests suggest evidence of bi-
causality between the stock markets and  foreign exchange markets. 
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I Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to primarily determine whether the domestic stock market can 
be used as a leading indicator during a regional currency crisis, as in East Asia during 
the late 1990s. In addition we investigate whether the major stock markets within East 
Asia had any effect on the currencies suffering the crisis and can also be used as an 
early warning system. A particular feature of the East Asian crisis was the almost 
simultaneous decline in asset prices and currencies, as international investors moved 
their capital out of the respective domestic markets. This resulted in a subsequent 
depreciation of the exchange rate as the domestic currency was sold. However the 
degree of severity of the crisis varied across East Asia, as did the extent of the decline 
in the domestic stock markets. 
 
 To date most models for predicting currency crises have concentrated on leading 
indicators from either the banking sector or the current account (e.g., Kaminsky et al., 
1998, Kwack, 2001). When stock prices have been included, it has been limited to 
only domestic stock prices. In this paper we suggest a simple monetary based model, 
in which stock prices can be incorporated as a leading indicator of currency crises. We 
also investigate whether foreign stock prices are a significant leading indicator, based 
on three theories concerning the origins of the South East Asian currency crisis.  
 
 When investigating the relationship between stock prices and exchange rates, the main 
concern is usually over the direction of causality between these variables. There are 
theoretical reasons for causality to run in both directions, as suggested by Bahmani-
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Oskooee and Sohrabian (1992) and Granger et al (2000). The empirical evidence is 
equally ambiguous, although Granger et al (2000) finds evidence of causality running 
from stock markets to exchange rates during a currency crisis. In this study we too 
assume causality is from stock prices to exchange rates. 
 
 Following the introduction, we assess the interrelationship between stock prices and 
exchange rates during a currency crisis. We then derive a simple model of currency 
crises, in which stock markets are incorporated through the demand for money 
function. The next section describes the data and assesses the results from the 
empirical models. Finally we give our conclusions and suggest some implications for 
future policies. 
 
II Currency Crises and Stock Prices 
 
 The main attempt to incorporate the domestic stock market into empirically based 
currency crisis models has been Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) and Kaminsky et al 
(1998). These models incorporate a number of real, financial and political variables in 
purely empirical models, to identify which are significant and also the length of the 
signalling horizon. The domestic stock markets are generally found to be a significant 
leading indicator of currency crises, over a number of different currency crises in the 
recent past. In the study by Kaminsky et al. (1998), stock prices are found to be the 
fourth best predictor of currency crises.  
 
 There has been a certain amount of debate in the literature as to the direction of 
causality between stock prices and exchange rates. Granger et al. (2000) show that 
causality runs from domestic stock prices to exchange rates. They offer some 
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theoretical support for a bi-directional relationship between the stock market and 
foreign exchange market, but only over the short run. They argue that a change in 
exchange rates would change the market value of all firms that trade internationally. 
This would depend on whether the firms are net importers or exporters, such that if in 
aggregate most firms were net exporters, a devaluation would have a beneficial affect 
on those firms profitability and therefore stock market value. This causal relationship is 
termed the traditional approach, although it does not specify the sign of the effect. 
 
 In contrast to this approach, both Bahmani-Oskooee and Sohrabian (1992) and 
Granger et al. (2000) stress the importance of the portfolio approach to analysing the 
relationship between stock prices and exchange rates. This suggests that a rise in stock 
prices, increases the domestic wealth of investors, facilitating a rise in the demand for 
money. Following the consequent rise in interest rates, capital is attracted into the 
domestic economy appreciating the domestic currency. This approach assumes there is 
a negative relationship between stock prices and exchange rates, with causality running 
from the stock market to the foreign exchange market. Wu (2001) provides evidence 
of the negative relationship between equities and exchange rates in South East Asia. 
This explanation is the most relevant to this relationship during a currency crisis. We 
have conducted a set of Granger causality tests between domestic stock prices and 
exchange rates, as with other studies, there is evidence of bicausality between the 
stock market and foreign exchange markets. When causality runs from stock prices to 
the exchange rate, there is a negative relationship, which suggests the portfolio 
approach is most important in South East Asia. 
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 Apart from the US stock market, we have investigated whether the crisis could have 
originated from any of the main neighbouring stock markets, in Japan, Hong Kong and 
China. Although the crisis began in Thailand1 in 1997, others have suggested the crisis 
began earlier than this, with both China/ Hong Kong and Japan being suggested as 
contenders. Fernald et al (1999) have suggested that the rise in China’s economic 
strength during the 1990’s added to the crisis. They focused on the 1994 devaluation 
and subsequent strong export performance as the cause of the troubles, as China 
captured export markets, which had previously been dominated by the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. This facilitated current account 
problems, reduced company profitability and culminated in the general financial demise 
of the area. It has also been argued that a further source of the crisis could have been 
Hong Kong, which in 1997 was officially returned to China from the UK. Initially this 
had a positive effect on Hong Kong’s share prices, but as the date for the handover 
approached, so concern about investment in Hong Kong increased. 
 
 Some argue that another source of the crisis was Japan. Following rapid rises in the 
stock market during the 1980’s, the early and mid 1990’s saw a reversal of this trend, 
with some sharp falls. At the same time the Japanese economy experienced an era of 
stagnant growth and lack of demand. This facilitated a decline in demand for ASEAN 
imports and a fall in investment flows to these countries. The financial crisis in Japan 
culminated in the failure of Yamaichi corporation in 1997, the fourth largest financial 
institution. This in turn caused another large fall in the Japanese stock market. 
 
                                                        
1 For a detailed description of the events leading to the crisis and the subsequent efforts to control the 
situation, see Radelet and Sachs (1998). 
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 If either Japan or China/ Hong Kong were the instigators of this crisis, then a measure 
of their financial troubles could be a useful leading indicator for the currency crises in 
East Asia. To determine if this is the case, we have incorporated the stock market 
indices of China, Hong Kong and Japan into the basic monetary based model, along 
with the domestic stock market index. 
 
III Model 
 
 The following model is based on the Krugman (1979) model of currency crisis, with 
stock market effects incorporated through the money demand specification. As with 
Edin and Vredin (1993), this is only used as a basis for the empirical investigation and 
as with the leading indicator literature in general, other related leading indicators are 
also incorporated into the empirical tests, without specific theoretic modeling. The 
stock market is included in the money demand function2 for three reasons, as 
suggested by Friedman (1988). It primarily acts as a wealth effect, as a rise in stock 
prices increases nominal wealth. Additionally a rise in stock prices reflects a rise in 
expected returns from risky assets. To offset this rise in risk, agents switch away from 
long-term bonds to safer monetary assets. Thirdly a rise in stock prices implies a rise in 
financial transactions and thus transactional demand for money. These imply a positive 
relationship between money and stock prices. There could also be a negative 
relationship through a substitution effect. As stock prices rise, agents substitute the 
                                                        
2 The stock market could have been related to other macroeconomic variables, such as consumption, 
output and investment. However given the monetary basis of most currency crisis models, we have 
incorporated it into the money demand function. 
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more attractive equities for money. However as with Friedman (1988) we assume the 
positive effect dominates. 
 
  As with the conventional monetary model, we assume purchasing power parity (PPP) 
and uncovered interest parity (UIP) 3hold; 
 
  e p pt t t 
*         (1) 
 
Where, e is the exchange rate, p are domestic prices and p* are foreign prices. 
 
  E
de
dt
i it t( )
*         (2) 
 
 Where i are domestic interest rates and i*are foreign rates. Money demand takes the 
following form: 
 
  m p y i st t t t t                             (3) 
 
 Where m is domestic money balances, y is domestic income and s is a domestic stock 
market index. We have assumed that the domestic money supply is purely 
accommodating.  By rearranging the above equations, we get:  
 
                                                        
3 As with currency crisis models in general based on the monetary model, we have assumed PPP and 
UIP, although empirical studies question whether the former holds due to trade impediments and 
transport costs and the latter due to the presence of a risk premium. 
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dt
desypime ttttt

  **      (4) 
 
To test for the effects of stock prices on the exchange rate, we have chosen a standard 
empirical model, based on equation4 (4). This suggests the crisis is a function of: 
 
 ),,,*,*,,,( xsresrerdspiymfcc      (5) 
 
Where cc is the rate of change in the exchange rate for the month when the exchange 
rate is in a crisis condition. It takes a value of one when a depreciation is greater than 
2% and zero otherwise. M is the domestic money supply (M1), y is output, i* is the 
US interest rate, p* is the US price level, ds is the domestic stock market index, rer 
is the change in the real exchange rate, res are foreign currency reserves and xs are the 
relevant foreign stock market indexes (All variables are in logs and in change form).   
 
 As with Edin and Vredin (1993) we have also included the real exchange rate, rather 
than the nominal exchange rate and added foreign exchange reserves. The relevant 
foreign stock market indexes are the US, Japan, Hong Kong and China. The US stock 
market is included because the East Asian currencies were pegged to the dollar, the 
                                                        
4 An alternative approach would have been to include a variety of other relevant variables relating to 
the banking sector, current account and political factors, as in Kaminsky et al. (1998). However in 
order to provide a theoretical basis for the empirical tests, the emphasis is on variables relating to the 
Friedman based monetary model. In addition it would not be possible to incorporate all the potential 
leading indicators into the model, so we have concentrated on those related to the stock market. The 
inclusion of current account effects into the basic monetary model was beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Japanese markets have traditionally had a strong effect on the region as a whole. China 
has recently undergone important political changes which have affected their financial 
markets and Hong Kong has been transferred from UK to Chinese control. 
 
 In addition to the main leading indicator tests, we have also included some panel 
based Granger causality tests (see Blomstrom et al., 1996), between the exchange 
rates and domestic stock prices, as well as some additional causality tests between the 
exchange rates and foreign stock price variables. The basic tests are: 
 
 
tititit
tititit
vess
usee




12110
12110


     (6) 
 
 Where e is the exchange rate, s is the stock price variable and u and v are error terms.  
 
 IV Data and Results 
 
The countries included in the investigation are those that experienced the worst 
problems during the crisis. This includes Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia 
and the Philippines. The data is all monthly, running from January 1996 to December 
1999, so including months where a crisis was evident as well as months in which the 
exchange rate was relatively stable. The exchange rate is expressed as the domestic 
currency in terms of the US dollar, the foreign explanatory variables are the respective 
US variables. This reflects the fact that the relevant currencies were initially all in 
effect pegged to the US dollar. The data on prices, foreign exchange reserves, money 
supply, industrial output and interest rates are taken from International Financial 
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Statistics and  Datastream. The stock market data consists of the total return 
expressed in index form as supplied by Datastream. This incorporates both the capital 
gain and dividend5 payment. In addition to the standard currency crisis variables and 
the domestic stock market indices, we have also added stock market variables from 
surrounding countries. This includes Hong Kong, China and Japan, where the origins 
of the crisis are believed to have began, as well as the US stock market variable. 
 
 The conventional Granger causality tests are reported in Table 1, as with Blomstrom 
et al. (1996) we have included country dummy variables and use the t-statistic on the 
lagged explanatory variable to determine if there is evidence of causality. The results 
suggest evidence of bi-causality between the exchange rate and domestic stock prices, 
as found in Kwack (2000). In addition there is evidence that the stock prices in China 
and particularly Japan have affected the East Asian exchange rates. 
 
A binomial probit6 is used to estimate the various models, where we define a crisis as a 
depreciation of the currency in any month greater than 2%. This roughly equates with 
                                                        
5 Friedman suggests using a stock market index such as the main market index in his 1988 paper. 
However other studies have suggested using the return on equities and the dividend yield as an 
alternative measure of the stock market. The Datastream index of stock prices includes both the 
capital gain and a dividend yield in the index, where the dividend yield is treated as a further capital 
gain. 
 
6 The use of the probit econometric technique in the currency crisis literature is widespread but has a 
number of associated weaknesses. It tends to lead to a limited definition of a currency crisis and does 
not take into account the complicated and individual nature of a crisis (e.g. Radelet and Sachs). Other 
studies have used the endogenous switching type of model (Edin and Vredin, 1993). However this 
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the definition of a currency crisis given by Frankel and Rose (1996), which is a 
depreciation of the exchange rate greater than 25% in any given  year7. Other values 
were also estimated, but made little difference to the results. The model has been 
estimated using both fixed and random effects, however in all tests there are no 
significant differences between the results, so only the fixed effects are reported. 
 
 The first model to be estimated is the basic model, in which the variables are lagged 
once, incorporating only domestic stock prices. The result is presented in Table 2 and 
suggests the domestic stock prices and US prices are significant leading indicators, 
although other domestic variables are insignificant8 Other lag lengths were also added, 
but tended not to be significant as financial markets adjust relatively quickly. The 
second model incorporates US stock prices, which are not significant, suggesting 
although the US real economy affected the crisis, the US stock prices are not a good 
leading indicator.  
                                                                                                                                                              
type of model was not suitable for the East Asian financial crisis, as following the devaluations the 
financial regime changed, with the exchange rate floating and capital controls reinstated. 
 
7 We could have used various different definitions of a currency crisis, by incorporating movements in 
reserves and interest rates into a crisis variable. As we are concentrating specifically on the exchange 
rate and stock price relationship, we used only the exchange rate in our crisis variable. Radelet and 
Sachs (1998) use a similar technique to that used here, however they define the crisis as being a sharp 
shift from a capital inflow to outflow. 
 
8 As with other studies of the East Asian financial crisis, the domestic variables were generally not 
significant leading indicators of the crisis. However we assume that they are significant out of the 
crisis. 
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In models 3 and 4, currency reserves and Thailand’s stock price are included in the 
basic model. As with other studies reserves are not significant although the Thailand 
stock price is significant at the 10% level of significance This is not surprising as the 
crisis began with the collapse of Thailand’s stock market. The domestic variables are 
generally not important predictors of the crisis, including the change in the real 
exchange rate, which as in Radelet and Sachs (1998) is insignificant. This result tends 
to support the contention of many observers who suggest there were very few 
domestic indicators of the impending crisis in these economies (e.g., Furman and 
Stiglitz (1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998)).  
 
 The further inclusion of the Japanese, Chinese and Hong Kong stock prices 
individually into the model, shows that except for the Japanese stock market, these are 
significant, which supports the theory that the origins of the currency crisis was not the 
relatively small domestic stock markets, but the more powerful stock markets of some 
of the neighbouring economies, particularly Hong Kong. All three stock markets are 
negatively signed, again suggesting that the falls in the respective markets precipitated 
the currency crisis. The probability of predicting an outcome correctly is reasonably 
high at about 70%9 in each case. 
 
 The final set of tests involves all three neighbouring stock markets included in the 
model. Only the Hong Kong market is significant of the three main East Asian 
markets. This provides possible evidence that the instability within the ASEAN 
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countries may have been affected by Hong Kong’s financial markets. The instability in 
these markets was caused primarily by the change in ownership of Hong Kong in 
1997, when China took over administrative control from the UK. However Hong 
Kong did not suffer from a currency crisis itself, this may be due to the larger size and 
greater development of its financial markets as suggested by Radelet and Sachs (1998) 
or due to the authorities using their reserves to purchase equities, thus preventing a 
collapse on the Hang Seng. 
 
V Conclusion 
 
This paper provides evidence of the domestic stock market being a significant leading 
indicator of the recent East Asian currency crisis, unlike other domestic variables. 
Although the most significant leading indicator of the crisis were US prices. In general 
the effectiveness of the domestic stock prices is less powerful as a leading indicator 
than the stock prices of the main economies in East Asia, particularly that of Hong 
Kong.  
 
 The results in general support the evidence from other similar studies on the East 
Asian crisis, as there is little evidence that in general the domestic fundamentals could 
have been used to predict the crisis. However it could have been possible to predict 
the crisis, based on the main neighbouring foreign stock markets, particularly the Hong 
Kong stock market. This implies that volatility in the Hong Kong economy and 
financial markets in 1997 may have affected these neighbouring economies. This 
                                                                                                                                                              
9 However this is in effect an in-sample forecast. Using an out-of-sample forecast, as is usually the 
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supports the various contagion theories, although it does not explain why some 
financial markets survived the crisis better than others. 
 Finally, although this model could act as an important early warning system, it has a 
number of limitations. These mainly relate to the individual nature of most crises, 
where different institutional and political factors affect the crises in different ways. 
However the intervention in the Hong Kong stock market by the authorities during the 
crisis, may have saved Hong Kong from a similar fate to its neighbours and provides 
the possibility of a mechanism for preventing such crises from occurring in the future. 
This could form part of an area for future research, as could the use of daily rather 
than monthly data as such data becomes more available. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
case with policy makers, is likely to lead to a smaller probability of correctly predicting a crisis. 
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Table 1. Granger causality tests between Stock prices and Exchange rates. 
 
 ΔE ΔDS 
ΔE(-1) 
ΔDS(-1) 
ΔHKS(-1) 
 
-0.087 (1.674)** 
-0.074 (1.159) 
0.182 (1.916)** 
ΔUSS(-1) 
ΔCHS(-1) 
ΔJPS(-1) 
0.070 (0.499) 
-0.076 (1.683)** 
-0.209 (1.927)** 
 
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. E and DS are the 
domestic exchange rate and stock price respectively. 
HKS, USS, CHS and JPS and Hong Kong, US, China 
and Japan’s stock prices respectively. The variables 
along the first row are the dependent variables, the 
lagged explanatory variables are down the first column. 
** indicates significance at the 10% level of significance. 
Only one lagged explanatory variable included. 
Causality results from the exchange rates to the foreign 
stock markets are not included as are not relevant. 
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Table 2. Probit Models using panel data from Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, 
Philippines and Indonesia 
Variable 1  2 3  4 
ΔM (-1) 
 
ΔDS (-1) 
 
ΔUSP (-1) 
-1.157 
(1.709) 
-0.620* 
(2.363) 
-107.181* 
(11.195) 
-1.136 
 (1.681) 
-0.585* 
(2.186) 
-1.3.874*  
(9.488) 
-1.095 
(1.596) 
-0.572* 
(2.170) 
-102.311* 
(9.916) 
-1.131 
(1.442) 
-0.320 
(0.847) 
-110.289* 
(10.234) 
ΔUSS (-1) 
 
USi (-1)  
 
ΔY (-1) 
 
 
0.064 
(0.308) 
-0.608 
(1.312) 
-0.393 
 (0.615) 
0.073  
(0.351) 
-0.629 
(1.363) 
 
 
0.007 
(0.032) 
-0.708 
(1.514) 
 
 
0.057 
(0.240) 
-0.636 
(1.253) 
ΔRER (-1) 
 
ΔRES (-1) 
 
ΔTHS(-1) 
0.283 
(0.807) 
0.281 
(0.807) 
0.206 
(0.577)  
-0.796 
(1.453) 
0.090 
(0.232) 
 
 
-0.471 
(1.651) 
L-L 
Probability 
-122.031 
70% 
-121.841 
71% 
-120.956 
73% 
-97.229 
68% 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. Probability is the probability of a predicted 
outcome occurring from the 115 possible outcomes, acting as a pseudo-R2. M is the 
money supply, DS is the domestic stock price, USP, Usi and USS are US prices, 
interest rates and stock prices respectively. Y is output and THS are Thailand’s stock 
prices, RER is the real exchange rate and RES are reserves. L-L is the restricted log 
likelihood A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 3. Probit Models using panel data from Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, 
Philippines and Indonesia, including foreign stock prices. 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
ΔM (-1) 
 
ΔDS (-1) 
 
ΔUSP (-1) 
-1.061 
(1.596) 
-0.445 
(1.668) 
-107.643* 
(12.306) 
-1.129 
(1.665) 
-0.500 
(1.860) 
-109.676* 
(11.680) 
-1.116 
(1.655) 
-0.594* 
(2.265) 
-106.075* 
(11.008) 
-1.071 
(1.609) 
-0.476 
(1.747) 
-116.063* 
(10.558) 
ΔUSS (-1) 
 
USi (-1) 
 
ΔY (-1) 
 
 
0.041 
(0.188) 
-0.573 
(1.266) 
 
 
0.082 
(0.391) 
-0.535 
 (1.150) 
 
 
0.110 
(0.519) 
-0.683 
(1.450) 
1.069 
(1.224) 
0.064 
(0.278) 
-0.578 
(1.234) 
ΔRER (-1) 
 
ΔJPS (-1) 
 
ΔCHS (-1) 
0.040 
(0.114) 
 
0.175 
(0.500) 
 
 
-0.493* 
(2.292) 
0.253 
(0.718) 
-0.602 
(1.093) 
-0.035 
(0.097) 
-0.512 
(0.820) 
-0.047 
(0.164) 
ΔHKS (-1) 
 
L-L 
Prob 
-0.974* 
(3.072) 
-117.412 
72% 
 
 
-119.494 
72% 
 
 
-121.431 
 71% 
-1.141* 
(2.234) 
-116.428 
73% 
Notes: See Table 1 and 2. 
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